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It is curious that sociologists have never engaged in any
serious or sustained discourse on the criteria for constituting
histories of sociological theory-thought, though the interest in
such history generally dates back at least to Giddings and Small.
From the earliest volume by Bristol on Social Adaptation in
1915 up to Turner's and Beeghley's The Emergence ofSociologi-
cal Theory in 1981, the prefaces, prologues, and introductions
are conspicuously devoid of any consideration of the general
problem of just how such undertakings are to be constituted.
Other literature is pervasively lacking in the treatment of the
problem. Even Merton's chapter "On the History and Systema-
tics of Sociological Theory ," which introduces his On Theoretical
Sociology in 19.67, does not directly tackle the problem. And
with the exception of one roundtable in 1978, the same void has
been characteristic of the American Sociological Association
meetings since at least World War II. To use the words of recent
French structuralism, a curious silence has prevailed. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to end that silence, to induce reflection, and
to stimulate and promote the beginnings of .theoretical dis-
course on the problem of the nature of an acceptable history of
sociological theory-thought.
Admittedly, several somewhat unusual circumstances may
have occasioned this current lamentable state of affairs. Unlike
other fields, the history of sociological theory seems to owe its
existence more to pedagogical than to research considerations.
(Undeniably, sociologists do engage in research in the history
of theory but it has had little impact on the writing of textbooks.
And publishers have not been especially inclined to question
current conventions of textbook writing in the field.) Then, too,
the raising of the issue as this paper does may seem to articulate
disconcerting implications for the boundaries between history
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and sociology or for the primacy of professional commitments.
(All the way up to the early 1940s, sociologists were seriously
exercised about their adherence to science as the study of the
general, universal, common and recurrent, which they regarded
as characteristically and categorically different from history as
the study of the particular, concrete, non-recurrent, unique or
eventful.) But certainly some recent historians and sociologists
have begun to draw on one another's disciplines with little fear
of professional disloyalty. Undeniably, too, the cal.l ~or ~ soci-
ological history of sociological theory should also aid In dispell-
ing hesitation. ....
In any event, some candid and unflinching stocktakmg does
seem to be required. Accordingly, the author has undertaken an
examination of the volumes on the history of theory written
since World War II. By virtue of the concern with an extended
range of historical attention, those books devoted solely to cur-
rent or contemporary sociological theory have been excluded.
The number of volumes thus remaining to be scrutinized is just
under twenty (as specified below). On the basis of the inquiry,
two major modes of writing the history of sociological theory,
each with substantial disadvantages, if not defects, are evident.
of the two types, the history of theory as the history of
great theorists encompasses the larger number of works. It
includes: Barnes' (ed.) An Introduction to the History of Soci-
ology (1948), Mihanovich's Social Theorists (1953), Tima-
sheff's Sociological Theory (1955), Coser's Masters of Sociolo-
gical Thought (1971, 1977), Collins' and Makowsky's The.Dis-
- covery of Society (1972), Larson's Major Themes in-Sociological
Theory (1973), Jesser's Social Theory Revisited (1975), Tima-
sheff's-Theodorson's Sociological Theory (1976), Bierstedt's
American Sociological Theory (1981), Ritzer's Toward an
Integrated Sociological Paradigm (1981), Turner's and
Beeghley's The Emergence of Sociological Theory (1981), and
Zeitlin's Ideology and the Development of Sociology (1981).
The histories of theory of this type seem to have the follow-
ing major disadvantages, if not defects:
1. They tend logically to become a sociological version of
the "great man" theory of history. Such history of theory tends
to be constituted of a sequence of great men, eminent figures,
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gifted or unique personalities. The distinctiveness of each one
is emphasized. Ideas tend to become .associated with the unique
biography of the person and explanation or interpretation tends
to proceed accordingly. If carried to its logical extreme, this
approach individualizes, personalizes, or social psychologizes
history rather than sociologizing or structuralizing it.
2. They are inclined to use the vocabulary of concepts of
each particular theorists as' the point of departure, which in the
absence of any qualifying considerations, obstructs systematic
comparison. Nothing intrinsic to the approach requires sys-
tematic identification and analysis of similarities. However, it
is noteworthy that three of the most popular volumes of this
type do seek to introduce ad hoc qualifying devices. In his
revision of the Timasheff text, Theodorson retains the earlier
general notion of sociological theory and its features which he
can use to introduce comparison and generalization as he
chooses. By adopting a uniform presentational scheme (especially
the biography in context, the intellectual setting, and social
milieu), Coser can resort to generalizations between figures as
he desires. Turner and Beeghley invoke a similar expedient re-
quiring that each theorist's intellectual origins, his major works,
and his contributions to sociological modes and principles be
examined.
3. They are likely to pursue analysis at a surface, explicit,
apparent, or immediate level rather than at a subsurface, implicit,
removed, or deep level. In the absence of the imposition of
additional ·criteria, basic assumptions are not subject to syste-
matic and continuous examination. Nothing intrinsically de-
mands consideration of the underlying social epistemology or
methodology (e.g., empiricism vs. idealism or positivism vs.
humanism). Nor do questions have to be raised about the con-
tinuity or discontinuity of the nature of the social with bio-
physical nature or about its materialist or idealist quality or
qualities.
4. They tend to ignore the possible existence and detection
of pervasive continuities and discontinuities across time. Such
questions as might concern major differences between French
and German sociological theory up to World War I or the nature
of the continuities or discontinuities between American theory
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before World War I and that between World War I and II are
not likely to be raised. At best, attention can be directed to
p articular theorists. .
5. They seem to equate historicality with the assumption
(illusion?) of the passage of time in chronological se~ue.nc~.
Demonstration of actual intellectual differences (or similari-
ties) in accordance with specific dates is unnecessary. All that
needs to be shown is that the theories of figures succeed one
another chronologically or in some rough "before-after" or
"earlier-later" fashion. So, Theodorson (1976 :12) simply asserts
three periods in sequence. Turner and Beeghley (1981:xiii, xv,
xvii) arrange theorists by the categories: "The Birth of :he
Sociological Tradition" (Comte, Spencer, Marx), "The Maturing
Tradition in Europe" (Weber, Simmel, Durkheirn, Pareto), and
"The Emerging Tradition in America" (Mead only).
6. They pervasively avoid concern with the criteria in terms
of which inclusion in the "universe' of sociological theory
occurs. (Admittedly, Turner and Beeghley are unusally explicit.
They recognize that they are including only figures who can be
shown to contribute to their positivistic deductive-nomological
notion of theory. But they are unaware of or ignore the problem
they have created for Simmel and Weber.) Generally, the his-
tories of great theorists seem to imply universality. At least,
initially (i.e., in their earlier figures) such histories include
prominent theorists of diverse national and intellectual ante-
cedents. But their later and especially terminal figures tend to
be peculiarly drawn from the U.S.' The trend of the past of
theory curiously culminates ~n ~erican theorists, The history
of"theory as the' history of great theorists ulitmately seems to
have a curious resemblance to the (earlier) universal histories
of progress culminating in Western Europe and especially the
U.S. Indeed, sociological theory has a progressive-like (or "pro-
gressive"?) trend eventuating in American theorists. (But any
surprise must turn to chagrin: our histories of theories as the-
orists have been constituted by American theorists.)
In contrast, the histories of theory focusing on ideas are
fewer in number. They include: Martindale's The Nature and
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Types of Sociological Theory (1960, 1981), Nisbet's The Soci-
ological Tradition (1966), Sorokin's Sociological Theories of
Today (1966), Kinloch's Sociological Theory (1977), Botto-
more's and Nisbet's (eds.) A History of Sociological Analysis
(1978), and Wiley's "The Rise and Fall of Dominating Theories
in American Sociology" in Snizek's Fuhrman's, and Miller's
(eds.) Contemporary Issues in Theory and Research (1979).
The histories of theory of this second type pervasively seem
to have two major defeats:
1. The "idea" which is made the point of departure is
not precisely' defined and is not itself susceptible of internal
differentiation. For all of Nisbet's efforts, the "unit-ideas"
(community, authority, status, the sacred, and alienation) of
his The Sociological Tradition are peculiarly global and diffuse,
are independent of and discrete from one another, and have no
distinctive combinatory or integrative qualities. Though ob-
viously borrowed from Kuhn, Kinloch's paradigms of his Soci-
ological Theory are not defined in terms of definite and precise
features. "Organic," "conflict," and "social behaviorism" have
no specific referents. What constitutes the "theory" of Wiley's
"dominating theories" is left unanswered. The chapter units or
subjects which comprise the Bottomore and Nisbet volume can
perhaps best be characterized as sociological stances or orienta-
tions. But the defining characteristics are implict rather than
explicit and thus the orientations as such are vague and am-
biguous. Sorokin's Sociological Theories of Today endeavors
to be systematic, without being entirely successful. Attempting
to classify sociological theories in terms of their stance on the
question of the part-whole relationship in the social, he dis-
tinguishes (1966:37-41, 133-136) nominalistic (-singularistic-
atomistic) theories from (realistic-universalistic-holistic or)
systemic theories. In contrast, Martindale essentially recognizes
(1981 :xiii) that sociological theories have in fact dealt both
with epistemological-methodological and (social) ontological
problems, i.e., how the social is known and studied and what the
nature of the social is. For the former problem, he identifies
(1981:xiv-xv) two positions (scientific and humanistic) and for
the latter two also (elementaristic and holistic). And so four
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types of theory derive: humanistic elementarism, humanistic
holism, scientific elementarism, and scientific holism. (But even
Martindale seems to have provided only the most minimal,
elementary bases for a classification of types of theory.)
2. Curiously, these histories of theory emphasizing ideas are
disconcertingly insensitive to the passage of time. In Nisbet's
The Sociological Tradition, the years through which the unit-
ideas are analyzed, i.e., 1830-1900, are apparently regarded as
an undifferentiated whole or continuity. Nisbet offers no argu-
ment as to why the years thereafter should be construed dif-
ferently. Kinloch's text deals with time arbitrarily: he distin-
guishes a period of "traditional sociological theory" from a
period of "contemporary sociological theory." But he is vague
about what temporally differentiates one from the other. The
chapters of Bottomore's and Nisbet's (eds.) A History of Soci-
ological Analysis are arranged to suggest a chronological sequence
of sociological orientations from the eighteenth century (first
chapter), the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (chapters
two and three), nineteenth and twentieth centuries (chapters
four through eight), and up to the relatively contemporary
twentieth century (chapters nine through fourteen). The reader
is to assume temporal sequence. Like The Sociological Tradi-
tion, Sorokin's Sociological Theories of Today is not genuinely
sensitive to the passage of time. He treats (1966:6-11) the years
1925 to 1965 as an undifferentiated whole-without justification
for its separation from the previous period, other than the
" fact· that the terminal date of his -earlier 'Contemporary Soci-
olooical Theories was 1925. Finally, Martindale achieves a sense
of temporal succession by presenting and analyzing the ideas
of major figures from each of the four types of theory (including
also subvarieties) in chronological sequence.
With a critique of the major features of the two modes of
constituting the history of sociological theory completed, it is
now appropriate to turn to the proposal embodied in the
author's Founding Theory of American Sociology 1881-1915
(1980). Chapters one and three (especially pages 7-11, 59-65,
72-75) do indicate that its procedure aligns it substantially with
the second rather than the first type of organizing the history of
42
r
·.'···.·,.1'
'.I'
.:.:.:: ,'.•jt.:,..':,.' .
.~,'. ~.
i'~;_ ~.
~.,·I:
.",
History of Sociological Theory
theory. It does focus on ideas and especially those involved in
specifying basic, underlying assumptions. Its proposal to use a
classificatory-periodicizing scheme derives from the initial
decision that a history of (American) sociological theory would
have to. b.e envisaged rigorously in terms of what sociological
theory In Its niost comprehensive sense has meant in the past and
mean~ today. Thus, both an extensive and intensive scrutiny of
past literature (back to the founding figures) on the meaning(s)
o~ the term was undertaken. (Undeniably, some preoccupation
WIth etymology was involved and some attempt was made to
pursue the intellectual leads of Timascheff's Sociological Theory
[~. 11]: So~okin's So~ial and Cultural Dynamics [Vol. 2] and
hIS Sociological Theorzes of Today, and Martindale's The Nature
and Types of Sociological Theory and his chapter in his edited
Func~ionalism in the Social Sciences, 1965). The immediate
question of what makes sociological theory distinctively "socio-
l?gical" and '.'theo~etical" (i.e., a "theory") led back logically
fIrst to a consideration of "soci-ology" as the noun form of the
adjective "sociological," i.e., to the notion of the discipline
and profession characteristically endeavoring (to know and) to
study the social in its most comprehensive sense. More ulti-
mately, concern was directed to the two basic problem-domains
of: 1) the nature of sociological knowledge and the method of
study (social epistemology-methodology or the theory-theories
of social epistemology-methodology), and 2) the nature of the
social ~r social reality (social ontology or the theory-theories
of SOCIal ontology). Each of these two problem·-domains is
further specifiable into a series of additional questions or issues
a.nd their related possible answers or positions. (For the justifica-
tion of the terms used, consult Founding Theory, p. 331, note
two.) On this foundation of classificatory-periodicizing scheme
was developed (first in a preliminary, abbreviated form in an
article in The Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences,
Vol. II (2), April, 1975:108-109, and later in a more extended,
complete form in Founding Theory, pp. 60-64). Its fundamentals
are represented below:
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Essen rials of a Scheme for Classifying and Periodicizing
Macro-Theories in the History of American Sociology
I. Criteria for the analytical classification and periodicization of
sociological theory .. ..
A. The nature of theory in sociological theory (implying an
expanded concern with social epistemological-methodolog-
ical theory)
B. The nature of the social in sociological theory (implying an
expanded concern with social ontological theory)
II. Theory about knowing-studying the social (social epistemology-
methodology)
A. Bases of knowing the social (social knowledge)
1. Sensation (empiricism) vs. reason (rationalism)
2. Feeling - empathy - "nacherleben"
B. Methods for studying the social
1. Similarity-dissimilarity of methods for studying the
social biophysical sciences: positivism (as similar) vs.
humanism (as dissimilar)
2. Focus of methods on: parts (as methodological atomism
or individualism) vs, wholes (as methodological holism
or collectivism)
c. Epistemological-methodological implementation in formulat-
ing theory as:
1. Explanation (positivist, objectivist): physical model,
deductive-nomological, universal
2. Interpretation (humanistic, intersubjectivist): language-
communication basis; ethnomethodological-phenomen-
ological-hermeneutics construed; meaningfully limited.
III. Theory about the (known) social (so.c~~.ontology)
A. Conceptions of the social (as):
1. (Interpersonal and/or multipersonal) Relations(s) or
relationship(s)
2. (Interpersonal and/or multipersonal) Activity(ies)
a. The character of the activity: 'behavior,' 'action,'
'interaction,' 'sociation' (association-dissociation)
b. Forms of activity: (processes of) cooperation,
competition, conflict, accommoda.tion, assimilation,
etc.
3. (Persisting, structured) Group
a. Basis: interpersonal and/or multipersonal relations
and activities which persist and become structured
b. Kinds: dyads to society
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B. Relations of the social to other phenomena and/or realities
1. The social as a domain, realm, or system
a. As a type of object (or object-like) entity in nature
(as constituted of distinctive forces, for instance)
b. As a distinctive whole possessing some autonomy
from nature
2. Relations of the non- and near-social to social phe-
nomena
a. Non-human biophysical
b. Human: 1) organic, 2) psychic, 3) cultural, 4) near
social: as plurals, categories, aggregates
C. Nature of the social
1. As a form of reality
a. Preponderantly 'pure' forms (monisms): social-
sociological 'materialisms' vs. social- sociological
'idealisms'
b. Substantially 'mixed' forms (dualisms, etc., of
social 'materialisms' and social 'idealism')
2. In relation to the (logical-ontological) part-whole or
whole-part controversy ('universals-particulars,' 'holism-
atomism')
a. Social nominalism (and neo-nominalism)/social
atomism
b. Social realism (and neo-realism)/social holism
D. Major problems and their interrelations in the study of the
social
1. Genesis (origins, emergence)
2. Stasis (statics, stability, persistence, structure)
3. Dynamis (dynamics, instability, change, variation,
transformation)
This · scheme ·is central both to the particular historical
inquiry embodied in the author's Founding Theory and to his
general proposal for reconstructing the history of sociological
theory, which entails certain evident (hopefully, positive and
advantageous) features:
1. It demands that the history of theory become a research-
oriented field and not merely-and certainly not primarily-a
pedagogically-sustained field. Any attempt to use the classifica-
tory scheme demands research at two levels. One is at the level
of the documents of particular sociologists whose work or works
ranging across a particular interval of time is ascertained to be
classifiable as general or macro-theory. Initially, a statement of
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each sociologist's theory is worked out. It is cast i~ ter~.s.of how
he envisages the major problems of theory, what Its division are,
the major concepts used, the evidence accepted (and a~ceptable),
conclusions (and criteria for drawing such conclusions), etc.
Such individual statements (amounting to fifty to one hundred
typescript pages) were composed for Sumner, Ward, Giddings,
Ross, Small, and Cooley. Only then was an attempt made to
discern similarities and dissimilarities, to generalize, and to
translate the findings into the terms of the scheme. of course,
translation into the vocabulary of the scheme entails research
at a second level, which has been so important for Founding
Theory.
2. Ideas and especially basic assumptions are of central
concern. The focus is on ideas, notions, and concepts as they
are explicitly and implicitly interrelated wi~~ one ~other in
sets and unities and as they are cast in opposItIon to still others.
Furthermore, the interest lies not in an individual theorist's
ideas but with his and others' relation to one another in a com-
mon sociological position, stance, or orientation.
3. Comparative study is indispensable. Use of the scheme
facilitates the analysis and characterization of the intellectual
positions of a plurality of theorists acr~ss. t~me: .It seeks to
identify and typify both similarities and dlSSlmilarltles and thus
(technically) enables both comparisons and contrasts to ~e
drawn. The scheme basically directs attention to how the SOCIal
is to be known and studied (Le., a social epistemology and
methodology) and what the nature of the social is (i.e., a social
ontology, especially as the social is defined and t?en revealed
in the positions taken on the problems of genesIs, structure,
and change). The contents of chapters four through eleven of
Founding Theory follow accordingly · . .. .
4. The proposed approach requires IdentIfication of co.m-
mon intellectual positions or orientations, some or one of wh~ch
is dominant during a particular interval of time and for which
particular theorists become crucial expositors and/or represen-
tative figures. Allusions to particular theorist.s ~ ~erms.of such
general and dominant orientation(s) become JustIfIable m terms
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of their significance in the orientation. Presumably, their state-
ments are important in the development of' characterizations
and generalizations about the nature of general or macro-theory
within a particular time-interval. However, it is also necessary
to recognize that dominant orientations (or even important
subordinate orientations) ordinarily do not involve monolithic
uniformity. Knowing just how much internal variation exists
within a stance can become significant in terms of subsequent
theoretical developments. What may' seem to be minor dif-
ferences at one point in time may under different circumstances
become major and consequential.
5. By virtue of the identification and characterization of
such common and general intellectual orientations, some one(s)
of which is (are) dominant, periodicization can be effected.
History of theory is no longer merely the sequential arrange-
ment of theories of prominent theorists in (chronological)
time. Instead, it becomes a succession of periods, in which a
dominant orientation (perhaps achieving the status of an ortho-
doxy) may be followed in tum by a transition involving contro-
versy (and heterodoxy) among several contending stances, out
of which is generated finally another dominant orientation and
so on. Founding Theory does. characterize early American
theory as committed to "evolutionary naturalism" as the domi-
nant stance from about 1881 to 1915. Subsequent continuing
research suggests that the years from about 1915 to 1945 may be
best characterized as a transitional period in which basic assump-
tions vvere in such a state of controversy that no dominant
stance could or did appear. However, the action frame of ref-
erence was expounded by several prominent theorists, including
Parsons. That frame of reference provided an intellectual plat-
form for the development of structural-functionalism, the
orientation assuming increasing prominence and eventually
dominance from about 1945 to 1965. (It does appear that the
years from about 1965 to the present again constitute another
interval of controversy between and among opposing stances,
no one of which has yet decisively assumed dominance.) Cer-
tainly, it is important to examine the events occurring in systems
external to theory (i.e., its mileux) at the time one period seems
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to be ending and another beginning. (See Founding Theory)
pp. 300-301 and item No.8 below.)
6. Detection of both theoretical discontinuities and con-
tinuities between and among periods is assumed to be necessary.
Periodicization does signify discontinuity as is evident in the
decline-demise of an old and the rise-ascendancy of a new ori-
entation. However, the scheme also makes it possible to ascertain
just what assumptional similarities have persisted beneath or
even in terms of the sequence of (different and thus discontin-
uous) dominant stances. (Consult Founding Theory, pp. 229 and
pp. 306- 327 for voluntaristic nominalism as a persisting social
ontological assumption.) In the long perspective, i.e., over several
periods, minority of subordinate orientations may be conse-
quential.
7. The proposed approach envisages the possibility of an
explanatory account and toward that end facilitates resort to
hermeneutics and structuralism. For the former, it is to be
noted that the initial studies of individual theorists use their
published works as so many texts which must be synthesized
into more or less integrated statements for each one. Such
statements must be couched within the problem formulation
and the terminology used by or characteristic of the theorist.
Attention must be given both (to) what he or she accepts and
rejects, endorses and repudiates, agrees and disagrees.' Gradually,
a whole is inferred and constructed from the parts and, con-
versely, parts from an assumed whole. The procedure does m-
.. valve the well-known hermeneutic circle. As . in a particular
text or unit of theoretical discourse, so in the composite work
(of separate texts), the presupposition of a certain whole is
implied in the recognition of the parts. And reciprocally, the
construing of the parts implies a construing of the whole. Mean-
ingfulness is involved in the shuttling-back-and-forth between
whole and part and part and whole. Parts are interpreted in
terms of a whole and a whole in terms of parts.
But once the translation has been made to the language
or terminology of the scheme, the individual. statements have
necessarily become parts or aspects of a more generalized stance,
position, or orientation which has been formulated in terms that
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are generic to (general) theoretic discourse in sociology or
antecedent disciplines. What Levi-Strauss endeavored to do for
myths and kinship, the classificatory-periodicizing scheme
attempts to do for sociological theory. The scheme identifies
the basic opposing positions in the realms of epistemology-
methodology and social ontology (re: the notion of the social,
genesis of the social, structure of the social, and change in the
social). It is of the utmost significance that any generalized
theoretical orientation which is identified and characterized
through use of the scheme is already cast in terms of certain
basic oppositions, contrasts, and polarities. Accordingly, even
though the particular distinctions (each of which is part of a
paried antithesis) have importance, what is of considerably
greater consequence is the perculiar logic, form, or structure of
their relationship in constituting the whole of a theoretical
orientation. So the very nature of the classificatory scheme is
such as to embody the fundamentals of and provide access to
structuralism. (Note that this argument was not developed in
Founding Theory: it alluded only to a possibility of a genetic
structuralism, pp. 324-328.)
8. Formulation of an explanation is held to require the
study of evidence from at least two periods and from a series
of related contexts. Explanation is intrinsically general and thus
evidence about the dominance of one orientation from more
than one period (i.e., of a change) is needed. (What is to be
explained may include, therefore, dominant orientations sub-
'. ordinate orientations, persistence .of assumptional similarities .
across severalperiods, etc.)
Formulation of such 'explanation must thus include' not
only the present character of the theory (and past theory), but
appropriately analyzed information about a series of relevant
contexts: the character of other fields of sociology and their
personnel, changes within the structure of sociology as a profes-
sion; shifts in the other social sciences, the natural sciences,
the humanities, knowledge in general (both in the sense of
disciplines and professions); alternations in academia; the nature
of the relation of the professorate to the salaried professions,
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the free professions, and to the occupational structure in general
(as linked to social class, etc.), the nature of American society
and culture, including basic values. (It is necessary to note that
the contexts included in Founding Theory are provided only for
orientations of readers and not for subsequent construction
of an explanation.)
9. Critique is also possible (such as critical theory might
offer). Once the relevance of particular contexts and their
interrelations, and thus the directionality of their influence,
has been ascertained for a given dominant stance, the reverse
possibility might be entertained. Thus, it should be feasible to
inquire into the (obverse) problem of just what relevance the
dominant theoretical stance has for the maintenance of the
status quo in American society and culture. So critique might"
be undertaken. (Among other things, it should be illuminating
to discover the extent to which such an intellectual enterprise
converges with or diverges from the analysis of the Schwen-
dingers' The Sociologists of the Chair.)
10. In the broadest sense, the proposed mode of constitu-
ting a history of theory demands that the history being construc-
ted be explicitly situated, both spatially and temporally. A
universal history of theory is an illusion, for a history is always
such within some particular universe of discourse (e.g., that of
the u.s. or Europe) over a particular range of time. (Europe and
the United States seem to comprise more or less separate uni-
verses of discourse or traditions in the social sciences. Even
though they have influenced one another, they-have been .sub-
stantially independent.) Nevertheless, this mode of historio-
graphy also contemplates the possibility of undertaking compara-
tive studies of histories, e.g., the histories of American theory
and of European theory might be compared and contrasted.
But initially a more circumscribed step-by-step procedure seems
advisable, i.e., first the study and characterization of the history
of one is to be undertaken (and, indeed, has been undertaken);
'then the other next; and finally, on the basis of the two separate
studies, it should become possible to compare and contrast the
histories of the two in context.
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History of Sociological Theory
11. Finally, the approach advocated recognizes that no
history of sociological theory is constituted enternally-for all
time. As the eventuality of the future becomes the actuality of
the present, change occurs and history has to be rewritten in
terms of such now existing present(s). At the minimum, additional
periods are required and must be added to prior formulations.
At the maximum, it may be necessary to reconsider the character
of one or more parts of the scheme, to further differentiate and
extend it on the basis of past distinctions or even to reconstruct
and reconstitute portions thereof. (Past history is not to be
construed as sacred and neither is the scheme. See the last sen-
tence of the first paragraph of note two, chapter three Founding
Theory, p. 331.)
Hopefully, the silence has been broken. The two extant
major modes of constituting the history of sociological theory
have been articulated and subjected to criticism in theperspec-
tive of a third approach, the features of which have just been
outlined. Only as the potentiality of the future becomes the
actuality of the present will the interested know whether or not
research becomes a significant force in reconstructing a field here-
tofore so pervasively dominated by pedagogical concerns.
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